In most countries, academic pay is independent of discipline, thus ignoring differences in labor market opportunities. Using some unique data from a comprehensive research assessment exercise undertaken in one such country -New Zealand -this paper examines the impact of discipline-independent pay on research quality. I find that the greater the difference between the value of a discipline's outside opportunities and its New Zealand academic salary, the weaker its research performance in New Zealand universities. The latter apparently get what they pay for: disciplines in which opportunity cost is highest relative to the fixed compensation are least able to recruit high-quality researchers. Paying peanuts attracts mainly monkeys.
If a university went ahead and paid equally, lowering economists' pay and raising French professors' pay, it would have a great French staff and a dreadful bunch of economists. Hamermesh (2004, p180) 1 Introduction
Academic remuneration systems vary considerably. In a few countries, such as the United States (US), Hong Kong and Singapore, universities explicitly recognize that academics in some disciplines have more valuable labor market opportunities than others, and pay accordingly. In Europe and most other countries, however, academic remuneration varies only by rank and is independent of discipline, i.e., a professor is a professor for pay purposes, whether in Economics or French. 1 One might then expect, as illustrated by the quote from Daniel Hamermesh above, that the latter type of system would experience difficulties in attracting quality faculty in the disciplines with the most valuable opportunities. Somewhat surprisingly, this simple economic intuition has been the subject of little formal empirical analysis. In a recent paper, Ehrenberg et al. (2006) compare US academic salaries in English Language and Literature with those in 20 other disciplines and find that the salary differential is positively related to differences in National Research Council rankings. Combined with earlier work by Ehrenberg and Hurst (1998) showing that a department's ranking is positively related to various measures of research quality, this suggests that research productivity is high when salaries are high. However, because salary is an endogenous variable in the data, it is unclear whether higher salaries lead to better research quality or whether better research is rewarded with a higher salary. Ben-David (2007 , 2008 attributes the US-bound exodus of Israeli academics to the growing difference in academic salaries between the two countries, but the extent to which this varies across disciplines is unknown. Rather more evidence exists at the high school level, where Murnane and Olsen (1989) , Loeb and Page (2000) , Hanushek et al (2004) , Scafidi et al. (2006) , and Chevalier et al. (2007) report varying relationships between salaries and teacher recruitment, retention and performance. However, the measures of non-teaching opportunities used in these studies tend to be based on what are, at best, very broad subject categorizations. 2 As a result, the 1 Variation in the type of remuneration system can also occur within countries: the degree of salary flexibility in Canadian universities depends in part on the extent to which provincial labor laws have resulted in mandatory collective bargaining.
2 For example, Murnane and Olsen (1989) group all teachers into one of chemistry, physics, biology, mathematics, and humanities, while Loeb and Page (2000) and Hanushek et al. (2004) do not distinguish between different teacher subject qualifications or specialties.
role of outside opportunities in determining educator supply and quality remains unclear. 3 In this paper, I attempt to shed more direct light on this issue by examining the cross-sectional relationship between discipline research quality and market opportunities in New Zealand (NZ) universities. NZ academic remuneration is, with the limited exception of medicine and dentistry, independent of discipline, an arrangement that is usually justified on the grounds that all academics of a given rank are doing essentially the same job and hence deserve equal remuneration. However, labor market opportunities vary considerably across subject areas, suggesting that disciplines with the most valuable opportunities will have the most trouble in hiring high-ability, motivated and diligent researchers to work in NZ universities. For instance, talented NZ graduates in these disciplines are more likely to eschew academia for the business sector, while those that do undertake PhD study and a university career will be greatly tempted by the higher salaries available in countries whose academic remuneration systems better reflect market forces. And the only overseas researchers able to be attracted to fill the gaps will tend to be those with relatively low opportunity costs, i.e., low quality researchers. In short, disciplines with the most valuable market opportunities should be expected to attract weaker researchers on average.
To examine this hypothesis, I exploit a newly available dataset -the results of the initial quality assessment exercise conducted in NZ universities and other tertiary institutions during 2003. Although similar exercises had previously been conducted in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong, the comprehensive coverage of the NZ version made it unique. Known as Performance Based Research Funding (PBRF), it required all NZ academics to submit a research portfolio for assessment by one of 12 panels covering 41 disciplines. Each portfolio was given a grade for quality by the relevant panel. Although individual scores were not made available to the public, the average score for each discipline was computed and reported, as was the number of researchers a discipline had in each grade category. The data generated by this process thus provide synthesized and holistic measures of research performance for each discipline.
To proxy for discipline-specific labor market opportunities, I use US academic salary data. This choice of opportunity cost can be justified in two ways. First, to the extent that NZ universities compete for faculty who could potentially obtain employment in US universities, the salaries offered by the latter provide a direct measure of the discipline-specific opportunities available within academia.
Second, because they are set in response to broad labor market conditions, US academic salaries also provide an approximate ranking of a discipline's non-academic opportunities. Importantly, US academic salaries are a truly exogenous measure of the opportunity cost of working as a NZ university researcher, as they are obviously not influenced by NZ research productivity.
After controlling for other factors that may affect research quality scores, I find that more valuable opportunities have a significantly adverse effect on discipline research performance; on average, a one standard deviation increase in the average difference between US and NZ salaries lowers a discipline's quality score by about 12%. A higher salary shortfall also reduces the percentage of high grades achieved by a discipline, and increases the number of low grades.
In the next section, I provide more details about PBRF and the data used in this study. In section 3, I present the principal results and then, in section 4, discuss and assess alternative interpretations of these findings. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
Data

PBRF and measurement of research performance
All NZ universities are owned and funded by taxpayers, although additional income is obtained from the private sector in the form of gifts, endowments and research commercialisation, and from the component of tuition fees paid directly by students. The same is also true of most non-university institutions, but a small number of these are privately owned and operated, primarily by religious organizations.
Relative to other OECD countries, NZ devotes a relatively high proportion of GDP to the tertiary education sector, but this is heavily weighted towards student financial aid and non-university institutions. 4 Such a pattern has raised fears about the overall quality of NZ university education -see NZ Vice-Chancellors' Committee (2006) . Less discussed, but equally as interesting, is the possibility that quality also varies across disciplines.
The mechanism by which governments have funded universities has changed significantly in recent years. During the 1990s, funding of an institution's teaching and research activities was bundled into a single bulk grant, the size of which depended on the institution's student enrollments -commonly and colloquially known as a 'bums-on-seats' formula. This was justified by the requirement of the Education Act 1989 that all degree courses were to be primarily taught by those active in research. However, concerns subsequently arose that such a system did not allocate research funding to its most productive uses, and so in 2002 the NZ government announced the establishment of the PBRF scheme. Under this arrangement, the funding for research was to be separated from that for teaching using a formula based on (i) faculty research performance, (ii) number of research degree completions, and (iii) quantity of external research income. Of these, the most important, and the focus of this paper, is faculty research performance. Assessment of this component required all 8013 eligible academics to first nominate a discipline or subject area (from a choice of 41) within which their research would be evaluated, and then submit to one of 12 peer review panels a portfolio summarizing their research activities between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2002. Based on their assessment of how well each portfolio ranked within its nominated area, these panels then assigned each portfolio a quality grade -A, B, C or R, corresponding to a points score of 10, 6, 2, and 0 respectively. 5 In determining grades, panels considered three issues: quality of research output (70% of the grade), peer esteem (15%), and contribution to the research environment (15%). The first of these was primarily based on the researcher's self-nominated 'best-four' outputs (e.g., books and journal articles) during the assessment period, while the latter two were determined on the basis of supporting evidence submitted by the researcher. An important feature of this process is that scores in each category were based on international norms for the researcher's discipline. Broadly speaking, an overall grade of A indicated that the researcher's work was considered to be of sufficiently high quality to have established an international reputation in his or her discipline; a B grade corresponded to a consistent record of research productivity sufficient to have established at least a national reputation; while C indicated positive research activity but at a level not yet consistent with having either a national or international reputation. Differences in the international dimension of research across fields were also taken into account, e.g., the country-specific research typical of Law versus the more global knowledge generated by the sciences. Thus, the PBRF grades provide measures of research performance that (i) effectively synthesize the information contained in the various mechanical performance metrics that have been extensively used in the literature (e.g., citation counts) and (ii) benchmark this synthesis to international standards. As a result, they not only eliminate the need to calculate mechanical performance measures and to compare these across countries, but also, at least in principle, provide a broader and more holistic performance measure. Moreover, unlike citation counts, PBRF grades have a direct economic impact -approximately $320 million in university funding during the 2004-2007 implementation period, and about $200 million per year thereafter (all figures throughout this paper are expressed in NZ dollars).
Once the panels had completed the grading process, individual research scores were aggregated to obtain overall performance measures for departments, schools, institutions and, most importantly for my purposes, disciplines. For each discipline, I use the information reported in Tertiary Education Commission (2004) to construct three performance measures: the average quality score (on the 10-point scale) of its researchers, the percentage of its researchers awarded an A or B grade, and the percentage of its researchers awarded an R grade. While these measures are obviously related, they assess different dimensions of the quality of discipline research within NZ universities: the first estimates performance on average within a discipline; the second measures the prevalence of star performers in that discipline, while the third gauges the presence of weak performers.
In the appendix, I report the values of these research quality measures for each PBRF discipline. 6 On a full-time-equivalent basis (i.e., part-time faculty count for only the fraction of time they are employed), Philosophy has both the highest average quality score (4.74) and the greatest percentage of A and B grades (58.6), while Nursing has the lowest average quality score (0.34), the lowest percentage of A and B grades (1.9), and the highest percentage of R grades (86.7). Education has the greatest number of eligible researchers (995) and Dentistry the fewest (51).
NZ academic remuneration and measurement of alternative labor market opportunities
The NZ academic system has four principal ranks -professor, associate professor (or reader), senior lecturer and lecturer -which are themselves broken down into a number of salary steps. The salary payable to each rank-step is essentially determined (usually on an annual basis) by a collective agreement negotiated with the academic trade union; although some academics have individual contracts, they are usually offered whatever annual increase is agreed with the union. Importantly, these salary scales are the same for all disciplines, with only two exceptions. First, medicine and dentistry are paid on a separate (and somewhat higher) scale. Second, a salary premium over and above the standard scale is occasionally paid to researchers in hard-to-staff disciplines or to otherwise highly-valued faculty. Although data on such premia are subject to privacy constraints, discussions with university administrators suggest that these are sufficiently infrequent and small (a maximum of 25%) that they can reasonably be ignored in what follows; for salary purposes, I can safely assume that two representative academics exist in NZ -one for medicine/dentistry and one for all other disciplines. Primarily because of differences in the timing of salary awards, there is some variation in salaries across NZ universities, but this is tiny. To estimate NZ university remuneration at the time of the PBRF exercise, I take the salary prevailing at four leading universities for each of the four principal academic ranks and then average across ranks and universities. 7 For the non-medical group, this figure is $83131 in 2003-04. For medicine and dentistry, the corresponding figure is $105778.
Empirical assessment of the impact of such a remuneration system requires some discipline-specific measure of opportunity cost. One possibility is to use local graduate salaries by discipline. However, these are not particularly useful here, partly because they are a very noisy indicator of career opportunity costs (e.g., law and accounting graduates typically receive very low entry salaries), and partly because they are of little relevance to the foreign academics for which NZ universities compete. 8 Rather, true opportunity costs reflect not only competition from the NZ private and government sectors, but also competition from foreign universities (which in turn reflects competition from the private and government sectors in these countries). I therefore use data on US academic salaries contained in the Oklahoma State University (OSU) 2003-04 Faculty Salary Survey by Discipline, as such information serves two purposes. First, to the extent that the academic labor which NZ universities seek to recruit is internationally mobile, US academic salaries provide a direct measure of the alternative academic opportunities available to actual and potential NZ-based researchers. Second, because US academic salaries are set partly in response to the opportunities that exist outside academia, they also provide an ordinal indicator of the value of non-academic labor market opportunities. 9 The OSU survey, which has operated since 1974, reports high, low and average salary figures from 448 subjects taught at 92 doctoral-granting universities across the US. As well as providing information for the entire set of universities, it also reports separate results for various sub-categories: Research-I, Research-II, and Other. Initially, I focus on the data from the 49 Research-I universities since these institutions are most likely to compete vigorously for high-quality researchers and thus best reflect discipline-based differences in labor market opportunities. 10 To calculate the implied opportunity cost for each PBRF discipline, I proceed in three steps. First, the PBRF disciplines are matched to the relevant OSU subjects; because the OSU survey contains a much finer breakdown than PBRF, there are normally several OSU subjects making up each PBRF discipline. Second, the average US salary (across all ranks and subjects) is calculated for each PBRF discipline. Third, this figure is converted to NZ dollars using the end-2003 market exchange rate. Finally, I subtract the average NZ salary for each discipline from its US counterpart to create a single representative measure of each discipline's relative 'underpayment'. 11 In the subsequent analysis, I use this variable to estimate regression models of the general form:
where remuneration shortfall = average US salary -average NZ salary is the 'underpayment' variable described above and X is a vector of control variables that potentially influence a discipline's research quality. Note that almost all variation in remuneration shortfall across disciplines is due to US academic salaries -which clearly do not depend on NZ research performance. Hence, remuneration shortfall is fully exogenous to research performance.
Preliminary analysis
Before turning to estimation of (1), I first consider the simple bivariate relationship between research performance and remuneration shortfall. Panel A of Table   10 Ehrenberg et al. (2006) also employ the OSU salary data. More information about this survey is available from http://vpaf.okstate.edu/irim/FacultySalary.html.
11 Because only medicine and dentistry academics are paid discipline-specific salaries in NZ, the percentage difference between US and NZ salaries is highly correlated with the raw difference and hence yields virtually identical results. Similarly, because the average NZ salary is (almost) constant across disciplines, the choice of exchange rate has only a minor effect on the opportunity cost variable used in the subsequent analysis, and hence has essentially no effect on the results. 1 provides some summary statistics for these variables. Note that although these statistics directly use only 40 'observations', every observation is itself based on many pieces of individual data. On a full-time-equivalent basis, the average discipline has a quality score of 2.79, with 31% of its researchers achieving an A or B grade and 36% being deemed inactive in research (the R grade). However, as noted above (and as can be seen in detail in the appendix), there is considerable variation across disciplines, with some displaying much greater research quality than others. The average NZ academic receives $20710 (24%) less in annual salary than his US counterpart, but this also conceals great variation across disciplines -from a high of $90520 (108%) to a low of -$340 (-0.4%). A large difference between NZ and US salaries seems to have a depressing effect on a discipline's research performance: only one of the five most 'underpaid' disciplines lies in the top half of quality scores, and none of the ten most underpaid is also in the ten best research performers. Similarly, only one of the top-five research performers is in the 20 most underpaid disciplines. However, the scatter plots appearing in Figure 1 show that the relationship between research performance and remuneration shortfall is not clearcut: although they apparently indicate a broadly negative impact of remuneration shortfall on average quality score, and a broadly positive impact on the percentage of R grades, both relationships contain significant noise. This is confirmed by simple regressions of these two research performance measures on remuneration shortfall. When average quality score is the dependent variable, the estimated coefficient is -0.003, but the standard error is almost three times as large, resulting in a p-value of 0.73. Similarly, the coefficient estimate in the percentage of R grades regression is 0.066, but the standard error is double this number. Nevertheless, the scatter plots in Figure 1 have two interesting features. First, the eye-ball relationships become more striking if one ignores the six observations in the bottom left of panel A and the six observations in the top left of panel B. These data points come primarily from disciplines that have a relatively short academic history in NZ and employ small numbers of researchers -Communications, Design, Nursing, Sport Science, and Theatre. The sixth observation is Education, which has a relatively high proportion of its PBRF-eligible researchers employed in colleges whose primary purpose is teacher training. Such disciplines are unlikely to obtain the critical mass necessary to generate international-class research. Moreover, the principal objective of some of these disciplines is largely unrelated to academic-style research.
Second, the observations denoted by a square in both panels of Figure 1 represent those of the primary health disciplines -Clinical Medicine, Dentistry, and Public Health. Historically, these disciplines have operated on a salary scale that is approximately 25% higher than that available to others. Despite this, Clinical Medicine and Dentistry are still among the more underpaid disciplines. More interestingly, the relationship between research performance and remuneration shortfall among these three disciplines is ambiguous: although Dentistry (the bottom square in panel A and the top square in panel B) has both greater underpayment and weaker research performance than Public Health (the left square in both panels), Clinical Medicine (the right square in both panels) has a higher PBRF ranking and a greater remuneration shortfall than either.
Clearly, discipline research performance is affected not only by direct opportunity costs, but also by other variables that may themselves be correlated with remuneration shortfall. This confirms the need for multiple regression models that are able to properly isolate the underpayment effect.
Regression Analysis
The model
The choice of control variables in estimating equation (1) requires some judgement. In addition to remuneration, four factors seem plausible determinants of research performance at the discipline level: history and research culture, concentration of available resources, government funding, and ability to influence panel decisions. 12 Traditional versus Non-Traditional Disciplines: More traditional disciplines have significant advantages in producing high quality research. First, they are much more likely to have an established research culture. Second, they have had more opportunity to build up entitlements to professorial appointments, the group of academics most likely to score highly in an exercise such as PBRF. Third, they are more likely to employ significant numbers of researchers that enable 'excellence clusters'. To control for this effect, I define as non-traditional all disciplines that either were not taught in NZ universities prior to 1970 or primarily produce outputs of the 'performance' variety, e.g., Design, Film, Visual Arts. In the regression analysis, I use a binary variable that sets such disciplines equal to zero and all others (the traditional disciplines) equal to one. Of the 40 PBRF disciplines, 33 are categorized as traditional.
12 Of course, a number of other variables will also be important for individuals, but these are largely irrelevant at the discipline level, e.g., relative workloads will affect individual performance, but any workload shifting from one researcher to another can generally occur only within a discipline, thereby leaving discipline scores unaffected.
Presence of a Discipline in the Non-University Sector: The PBRF exercise encompassed not only universities, but also other tertiary institutions such as polytechnics, colleges of education, and private colleges. These organizations are legally permitted to offer degree-granting programs (primarily at the first degree level, but some also offer postgraduate degree courses), but are not able to use the title of 'University'. Participation by these institutions in PBRF was voluntary, not mandatory, and a number opted not to do so given the administrative and time costs involved relative to the expected benefits. As a result, their presence in the PBRF exercise is minor: the median discipline has only 2% of its submitted portfolios emanating from the non-university sector. And only in three disciplinesEducation, Religious Studies, and Theatre -does this proportion rise above 25%.
Nevertheless, because the non-university sector has traditionally placed less weight on research, the significant presence of a discipline in that sector is likely to lower its research performance. Moreover, the more non-university institutions that a discipline is taught in, the more its available intellectual resources are diluted, thereby hindering the emergence of clusters of research excellence. 13 To capture these effects, I create a variable equal to the number of non-university institutions in which the discipline has at least five PBRF-eligible researchers. The bigger this number, the more widespread the discipline's presence in the nonuniversity sector and hence the weaker its research performance is likely to be. Discipline Funding: As previously noted, most funding to universities comes directly from the government. The system for doing so is nominally cost-based, whereby laboratory subjects and other disciplines with expensive equipment are funded at a higher rate than other areas. However, these notionally high-cost disciplines frequently claim that this differential is insufficient to cover their greater expenses. If correct, this would reduce the resources they have available for research and hence lower their research performance scores. Alternatively, endogenous responses to high capital costs may leave such disciplines with a relatively rich resource base for research. To allow for these potential impacts, I include the per-student funding (in thousands of dollars) provided by the government to each discipline as a control variable. 14 Panel Representation: Not all disciplines are represented on the 12 peer review panels. Such disciplines may have been disadvantaged -Roberts (1999) finds evidence of bias towards departments that had panel membership in the 1996 United Kingdom research assessment exercise -so I control for this by using the proportional membership of each discipline in its relevant panel as an explanatory variable. If the PBRF exercise favours disciplines with panel representation, the various research performance measures should be increasing in this variable.
Panel B of Table 1 provides some summary information about these control variables (the full set of discipline-specific data appears in the appendix). The average discipline is taught at one polytechnic institution, receives funding of $8300 per student, and provides a quarter of the members on its relevant peer review panel. More interesting is the variation around these means: non-university presence ranges from zero to eight polytechnics and panel representation from zero to 100%. Such variation potentially has a large impact on research performance, and on the importance of remuneration shortfall for determining that performance. Table 2 ; the t-statistics in parentheses are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In columns (1) and (2), the dependent variable is discipline quality score; columns (3)- (4) and (5)- (6) examine the percentage of high and low grades respectively. The first model in each pair of columns includes only the discipline's 'traditional' status and remuneration shortfall as explanatory variables; the remaining models include the full set of control variables. In columns (3)-(6), the dependent variable y is a percentage, so I also report (in square brackets) heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics from models that use a logistic transformation z = ln y/100 1−y/100 . These results provide fairly strong evidence that variation in labor market opportunities has a non-trivial impact on research quality: disciplines in which NZ researchers are most underpaid perform significantly worse than those in which the degree of underpayment is small. On average, an extra thousand dollars of underpayment lowers a discipline's quality score by 0.02 points and its allocation of A and B grades by 0.23 percentage points, while raising the number of R grades by 0.34 percentage points. Put another way, moving from the most underpaid decile to the least underpaid predicts a rise in average quality score of about 0.73 points and a 14 percentage point decrease in the number of R grades awarded, approximately 27% and 40% of their respective sample means. Interestingly, remuneration shortfall seems to be more strongly related to the prevalence of poor performers than to the other quality measures.
Principal results
Estimation of equation (1) yields the results presented in
The models used in Table 2 explain between 45% and 73% of the variation in the three research performance measures, and all control variables have the anticipated signs. Traditional disciplines that are concentrated in the university sector, have panel representation, and are in a low government funding category perform better than non-traditional and high-cost disciplines and those that are commonly taught in non-university institutions.
To get some idea of the relative importance of discipline underpayment in determining research performance, I compute the predicted impact of a standardized increase in each of the continuous independent variables used in the regressions. The results from this exercise appear in Table 3 . A one standard deviation increase in remuneration shortfall, per-student funding, and the number of non-university institutions lowers the average quality score by 0.35, 0.28 and 0.72 points respectively (holding all other variables at their sample means, these correspond to falls of 11.7%, 9.0% and 23.8% respectively for a traditional discipline); the same in- crease in panel representation raises this score by 0.25 points. The relative effects on the other performance variables are similar: overall, variation in the degree of underpayment has about half the impact on research performance as variation in the number of non-university institutions at which a discipline is taught, but a bigger impact than either per-student funding or panel representation. 15 In the analysis above, the dependent variable is discipline research performance at the national level, but Tertiary Education Commission (2004) also provides performance data for each discipline at the university level. Although these data are more open to manipulation, they are potentially useful insofar as they allow me to control for possible university-specific variation in the commitment and resources devoted to research. 16 I therefore use these university-discipline (henceforth 'department') performance scores to re-estimate the models appearing in Table 2 and include, in some specifications, university fixed effects. As can be seen in appendix Table A-1, this procedure yields some findings that dif-15 A partial R-square analysis yields a similar conclusion. 16 As an example of possible performance score manipulation, a university with a relatively large economics group but a small finance one could improve the ranking of the latter, without affecting that of the former, by 'transferring' a small number of high-scoring economists to the finance group. Although this would not change the university's overall score (or have much of an effect on the scores of the two disciplines at the national level), it would assist its future marketing of individual disciplines and programmes.
fer from those previously obtained: the impact of per-student funding and panel representation (in the fixed effects models) is now economically and statistically negligible, and the R 2 values are lower. Other features are familiar: university departments specialising in traditional disciplines that are not widely offered in nonuniversity institutions perform more strongly than other departments, although the coefficient point estimates are somewhat smaller than before. Most importantly, however, the remuneration shortfall coefficients are essentially unaltered from the discipline-level results in Table 2 , with and without fixed effects -stronger labor market opportunities continue to be associated with weaker research performance even after allowing for inter-university variation in performance.
A fair amount of researcher discretion is available in the choice of data to use. For example, the remuneration shortfall variable appearing in the Table 2 models is constructed using data from the Research-I universities included in the OSU survey. An alternative approach would be to calculate this variable using all surveyed universities, but this yields results that are almost identical to those in Table  2 . Similarly, I re-estimate the Table 2 models (i) excluding medical and dental disciplines from the analysis and (ii) experimenting with the definition of traditional versus non-traditional disciplines (e.g., setting Education as a non-traditional discipline). Neither of these has any discernible impact on the remuneration shortfall coefficient estimate (see appendix Table A-2).
Alternative Interpretations
It is easy to be sceptical about the results of the previous section. After all, it is not uncommon to hear the claim that academics are not motivated by money, since if they were they would not choose to be academics. In this section, I discuss some other possible interpretations of the observed negative relationship between research performance and labor market opportunity cost and conclude that none has much support.
Part-time academics
An alternative explanation of the section 3 results is that disciplines react to the problems created by valuable outside opportunities by concentrating available resources on a small group of high-quality researchers, and complement these with a large number of part-time and adjunct staff. Because the latter are typically less productive researchers than full-time staff, disciplines that make greater use of part-time staff are likely to receive lower average quality scores, regardless of the performance of the discipline's full-time researchers.
To assess this view, I calculate the ratio of full-time equivalent to total discipline staff as an indicator of the prevalence of part-time workers in that discipline. However, when included in regression models this variable has no impact on either discipline research performance or on the results reported in section 3 (see appendix Table A-2).
New researcher bias
An undesirable feature of the 2003 PBRF exercise was its implicit bias against new researchers: because receipt of a research-active grade (C or above) was subject to a minimum quantity threshold, many new academics received an R grade despite being heavily engaged in research. If disciplines varied in the rate at which they hired junior researchers in the years leading up to the assessment exercise, this might introduce an omitted variable bias into my analysis. This bias could work either way. On the one hand, if the disciplines most active in hiring were also those with the greatest remuneration shortfall, then my results would overstate the true impact of the latter on research performance. On the other hand, disciplines that were able to hire at a high rate would, ipso facto, seem most likely to be those that were least financially constrained in obtaining qualified researchers. Understating the research performance of new PhDs would therefore primarily impact on the quality scores of the least underpaid disciplines, thus acting against detection of a negative relationship between research performance and remuneration shortfall.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way of checking whether or not the presence of new researchers introduces bias. 17 The PBRF exercise did not record, or even define, who fell into the new researcher category, so no discipline information on this issue is available. Examining university hiring records would also be of little use, since many new researchers were previously (or currently) employed by their respective universities while engaging in postgraduate study, and thus would wrongly appear to have had significant academic experience.
A possible proxy for the prevalence of new researchers in a discipline is the proportion of research portfolios that were not submitted to a peer-review panel (i.e., were automatically awarded an R grade). The logic underlying this procedure is that new researchers who failed to meet the minimum quantity threshold are likely to have been disproportionately represented in the group whose portfolios were not submitted: insufficient research quantity is fairly easy to observe whereas weak quality is more subjective, so universities are likely to have efficiently culled new researchers while being more willing to leave it to panels to decide cases involving experienced researchers with suspected low quality. However, including the discipline 'not-submitted' proportion as an additional explanatory variable introduces a tautological problem into the estimated models -a discipline with a high number of non-submitted portfolios will automatically have low research performance scores. Despite this problem, the remuneration shortfall coefficients remain significant in all specifications at the 1% level or better, and are of similar magnitude to previously tabulated results (approximately 50-70% of their Table 2 counterparts). Thus, the negative relationship between remuneration shortfall and research performance does not seem to be the result of new researcher bias.
Teaching matters too!
Perhaps the weaker research performance of disciplines with more valuable labor market opportunities is simply due to large numbers of students enrolling in those disciplines (precisely because of the valuable opportunities thus accessed), thereby necessitating a lot of time spent on teaching activities and leaving less time for research. According to this view, academics in the most underpaid disciplines are not intrinsically weaker researchers than their colleagues in other disciplines, just busier with other tasks.
However, there are at least two reasons for doubting whether this can explain the section 3 results. First, disciplines with high student numbers can, and typically do, respond by adopting less intensive teaching methods. Thus, while researchers in disciplines with high remuneration shortfall may have to cope with more students on average, it by no means follows that they actually need to spend more time on teaching duties. Second, even if such endogenous responses are difficult to implement or limited in their impact, greater student numbers generates funding for additional academic positions and so any adverse impact on individual research time should only be temporary.
Moreover, if these additional positions are unable to be filled due to a high remuneration shortfall -thereby making the above problem permanent and thus according the 'too busy' view some validity -this simply underscores the point that the most underpaid disciplines face the greatest difficulties in generating highquality research. Although some individual researchers in these disciplines may indeed be of superior quality, the disciplines as a whole are unable to recruit and retain enough of them to replicate this performance at the aggregate level (a problem then compounded by the excessive teaching and research demands placed on those who remain).
Finally, of course, the combination of high quality researchers and high teach-ing loads is a somewhat implausible one, given that the former seem unlikely to voluntarily choose the latter. A more likely scenario is that, faced with lots of students and a shortage of candidates to teach them, the most underpaid disciplines respond by lowering hiring standards while simultaneously keeping some positions open in the (usually forlorn) hope that better candidates will emerge. As a result, such disciplines are characterized by the combination of high teaching loads (due to the unfilled positions) and researchers who exhibit weak research performance (due to the lowering of standards).
Concluding Remarks
Using data from a university research assessment exercise in New Zealand, I find that discipline research quality is negatively related to the value of labor market opportunities: the greater a discipline's average salary in US universities, the weaker its research performance in NZ universities. The latter apparently get what they pay for: disciplines in which the compensation is lowest relative to opportunity cost are least able to recruit high-quality researchers and/or motivate their researchers to be productive. Paying (relative) peanuts attracts mainly monkeys, even in a profession where job motivation is frequently claimed to be derived from sources untainted by base financial considerations. 18 Of course, it is possible that these results merely reflect unobserved heterogeneity across disciplines that is correlated in some way with opportunity cost. Against this, however, I offer several pieces of counter-evidence which suggest that the principal results are robust to at least the most obvious sources of discipline heterogeneity. Nevertheless, some caution is advisable.
The implication that academics respond to financial incentives in a predictable manner potentially sheds light on the finding of Kim et al. (2006) that research productivity in economics and finance declines monotonically with age beyond the early career years. Those authors argue that this may be due to the greater administrative and mentoring duties imposed on older researchers, but my results implicitly suggest an alternative explanation: the opportunity cost of research in such disciplines rises with age. One way this could occur is via lucrative consulting activities: young researchers in economics and finance typically have few consulting opportunities available to them, but these increase in both quantity and value as greater experience is obtained, thereby making time spent on research increasingly hard to justify.
The results of this paper also have implications beyond academia. For example, publicly-funded institutions in the school and health sectors, comprising as they do a wide range of tasks that differ in their private sector value, are likely to face similar pay-quality tradeoffs. Moreover, it is not uncommon for service professions, in particular, to be subject to a national award wage that pays little or no heed to variations in geographic desirability or even cost of living. This paper suggests that such awards may have an unintended consequence: significant geographical variation in service quality, as in Hall et al. (2008) . Lazear (1989) argues that pay compression may be optimal for firms, in order to maintain morale and discourage internal competition, but my results indicate that such policies potentially come at a cost. The dependent variables are calculated by university; regressions without constants contain a fixed effects dummy variable for each of the eight universities. Departments with less than six full-time-equivalent staff are excluded. The number of observations is 213. University Panel Representation is the proportion of members of the relevant peer-review panel who come from the department's university; other variables are the same as in Table 2 . Absolute values of heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. * * denotes significance at the .01 level. 
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